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Abstract
The student debt crisis is one of the most prominent financial problems facing the United States
today. As of 2018, the student loan market is now the largest source of non-mortgage household
debt in the United States. Using data from 4-year public universities in the United States from
2013 to 2018, I examine the relationship between school selectivity and student loan default rates.
I employ an OLS model with measures of selectivity defined as ACT scores of incoming freshmen
and admission percentages of universities. Where higher ACT scores and lower admission
percentages signify an increase in school selectivity, I find a negative relationship with ACT scores
and default rates. These results are robust across model specifications and imply that higher ACT
scores lead to a decrease in the chance of loan default. I suggest education policy changes, such as
a personal finance seminar for incoming freshmen at low-selectivity schools, could lead to
decreases in default rates.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Problem Statement
About 46 million Americans have some type of student loan debt, 45.4 million of whom
have federal student loan debt. While it is uncommon for students to rack up six-figure debt, the
average debt at graduation from 4-year public and private non-profit colleges was $28,400 in 2020.
This statistic, coupled with the fact that 11.1 percent of student loans were 90 days or more
delinquent or in default before the pandemic, indicates a deeper problem with the post-secondary
education system. In addition, according to the Education Data Initiative, ten to twenty percent of
students are currently in default and Arts and Humanities majors who attended non-selective
institutions are the most likely to default on their student loans. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the effects of school selectivity on the default rates of student loans for public 4-year
universities in the United States. While I focus on the influence of two measures of schools’
selectivity, ACT scores and admission rates, I control for student demographics and school
characteristics.
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Chapter 2: Background
From allowing socioeconomic mobility, to granting an individual the means to chase their
intellectual passions, to simply helping people better understand the world around them, education
has been an integral part of society. However, the value of a college degree is impacted by how it
is financed, and in the past several decades, a worrying trend has come about regarding financing
a degree with loans. According to the National Student Loan Data System (NSLDS), the amount
of student borrowers defaulting or holding large debt balances (>$50,000) is increasing steadily.
Where the availability of loans has been plentiful and consistent, repayment rates have been
steadily decreasing.
Loan default, where payments have been missed by 270 days or more, has severe and longlasting consequences. It renders the borrower exempt from any further student aid and the loan
becomes ineligible for deferment. Default also affects the purchasing options of individuals,
limiting their credit and exempting them from certain jobs. Moreover, these loan programs allow
students to take on large amounts of debt without solid guarantees of repayment. It is common
practice for a student to take out a loan without knowing how they will eventually pay back that
loan. This oversight can be ruinous to a student if they fail to complete their degree or default on
payments. If students wish to finance an education with loans, they must also accept potential longterm financial ramifications.
Regarding student loan options, there are four types of federal loans offered based on age,
education program type, veteran status, dependency status, and how much pre-existing loan debt
one holds. Federal Student-Loan programs include the Direct Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loan,
the Federal Perkins Loan, and the Direct PLUS Loan. As of 2016, Direct Subsidized and
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Unsubsidized loans accounted for over 18 million loans nationally, or 90.8 percent of all loans
(Clifford, 2016). The interest rates for these loans are set by Congress and have been fixed between
3.4 percent and 8.5 percent depending on the type of loan and year of origination (Looney &
Yannelis, 2018, 2019).
Debt continues to grow while more and more graduating cohorts are entering the workforce
attempting to accomplish the Sisyphean task of paying off their education. While there are a slew
of papers attempting to explain the causes of the student debt crisis, much of the literature only
offers conjecture as to why tuition has increased or the predatory nature of the market for student
loans. Even though the default rates on these loans have fallen in recent years, the average default
rates for institutions are currently about 6.5 percent.
There is a lack of publicly available data regarding individual levels of student loan debt,
however, and measuring debt levels is difficult on more granular scales. Default rates for student
loans are a publicly available measure of student loan debt for a large number of post-secondary
institutions, making them a suitable replacement variable. If a positive relationship is found
between default rates and selectivity measures of schools, it means that less selective schools could
aid students by offering a seminar on managing debt. A personal finance course with an emphasis
on debt management, as part of the first-year curriculum, could potentially decrease the default
rate for these schools and have the added benefit of teaching students something they should have
learned in high school: how to manage their money.
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Chapter 3: Recent Literature
According to the FinAid, as of 2022, outstanding federal student loan debt has reached 1.8
trillion dollars, making it the second largest form of non-mortgage household debt in the United
States. Research regarding the subject of student debt levels has focused primarily on the inverse
relationship between government funding and tuition costs (Mitchell et al., 2016). Since the
financial crisis of 2008-2009, the drop-off in funding for post-secondary schools has forced
universities to raise tuition levels to compensate. While potentially necessary, it hardly matches
what the Higher Education Act (1965) had envisioned by granting more affordable educational
opportunities to underprivileged and impoverished citizens.
Different research methods have been implemented to understand trends for student debt
as well. In a study by Clifford (2016), education data from the six New-England states were used
to create a panel regression model, examining the effects of different types of institutions and
student demographics on default rates. Institutions, including public and private 4-year
universities, community colleges, and non-traditional schools, and demographics such as the share
of first-generation students and the share of low-income students were used in the study. Main
findings show that almost all student demographics had some influence on default rates, with the
most important determinant being the share of students that are first-generation. Clifford also
found that neighborhoods with below average incomes (<$30,000) and higher shares of minorities
had the highest severe delinquency rates on student loans. Institutional trends show that the highest
levels of default were in community colleges and non-traditional schools, followed by public 4year and private, non-profit 4-year colleges.
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There is a large foundation of prior research on student loan default, mainly focused on the
United States due to student loans being a prominent financial issue in education (Devaraj & Patel,
2020; Gross et al., 2009; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2018; Webber & Burns, 2021). Researchers
find that the literature states program completion, persistence, and success in school as strong
predictors of student loan default. Other factors, like unemployment, gender, and age are also
included in the list of research-backed predictors of default. Based on panel data from the 50 states
from 2008 to 2015, the authors show that unemployment, the average debt per borrower, and
consumer sentiment are significant in their contribution to 90 days or more delinquency and
default. Consumer sentiment in this case refers to the attitudes a student has towards personal
finance and the country’s economy at the federal level. An increase in consumer sentiment implies
a positive boost on the outlook on personal finance and the economy of the country. The
coefficients for unemployment, average debt per borrower, and consumer sentiment were all found
to be positive with respect the dependent variable, meaning that increases in each variable
increased the chance of delinquency and default.
Trends also exist for borrowers based on the amount they borrow and the repayment plans
they choose for their respective loans. Balakrishnan and Cynamon (2018) created a model that
calculates lifetime earnings of college graduates as opposed to non-college graduates to answer
the question “is college worth it?” By assuming average income from labor, taxes, unemployment,
investment, retirement, and mortality, they found a 47.8 percent increase in the lifetime earnings
of college graduates as opposed to non-college graduates. This difference, known as the “college
value premium,” was found to decrease depending on the way the degree was funded. Using a
regular, 10-year federally granted loan with mortgage style amortization and forbearance, and an
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income share agreement with flexible payments, the college value premium was shown to decrease
by 28.4 percent and 17.6 percent respectively. Delisle (2019) also suggests that an ISA would be
more beneficial to students and decrease the college value premium less than the current IncomeBased Repayment system (IBA). The current federal loan program system has failed to make
meaningful decreases in delinquencies and defaults, as can be seen by the rising number of both.
Changes to the methods a student uses to repay their loans could have greater efficacy on
decreasing default.
Looney & Yannelis (2018) examined borrowing and repayment trends from 2001-2011.
Using a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to see which factors had the greatest influence on
repayment rates, they found that the participation in extended repayment plans and forbearance
were found to be the largest determinant for the decrease in repayment (40-50 percent of variation).
The second largest determinant was the type of institution the borrower attended (20 percent of
variation) and larger enrollment in for-profit and public 2-year institutions was correlated with
higher default rates. Large-balance borrowers (>$50,000) were less likely to default on their loans,
but the largest amount of defaulted dollars was held by this group. 4-year private and 4-year public
universities had the largest proportion of large balance borrowers, with the largest portion of debt
being held in Graduate loans in the same period.
Differences in financial literacy have been found to cause differences in student loan
repayment as well. Artavanis and Karra (2020) examined a sample of 1,000 students from a
Massachusetts public university and the implications financial literacy had on the repayment of
student debt. Where financial literacy is defined as the education of personal finance, there were
found to be low levels of financial literacy among female, minority, and first-generation students.
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Based on the results of the study, 38.2 percent of low-literacy students underestimate future loan
payments by more than $1,000 annually, while high financial literacy reduces the probability of
significant payment underestimation by 17-18 percentage points. They conclude that a financial
literacy wage gap exists, caused by students with low financial literacy expecting significantly
lower starting salaries than their high-literacy peers. Due to this wage gap, low-literacy students
are more vulnerable to unexpected shocks on their payment-to-income ratios that can impair future
creditworthiness and undermine their ability to pay off debt post-graduation.
Carnevale et al., (2019) examined the returns-on-investment (ROI) of different liberal arts
colleges across the United States. Using 4,500 institutions, the authors examined differences in the
Net Present Value for institutions based on student demographics. The share of low-income
students and Pell grant recipients in a university had a negative influence on the ROI, while
graduation rates and the proportion of STEM majors had a positive influence on ROI. Reported
geographic differences show that the New England area held the universities with the highest ROI,
while the Southwest held the universities with the lowest ROI. Both researchers (Clifford, 2016;
Carnevale et al., 2019) find that the number of STEM degrees awarded to students in a given year
had positive effects on students’ outcomes (lower likelihood of loan default for the Clifford study
and a higher return-on-investment for the Carnevale study).
Monks (2014) uses data from the several different sources, and creates two regression
models examining how different institution measures, like graduation rates and SAT midpoints,
influence the average debt for students. The quality of institutions, measured by higher or lower
SAT midpoints, was found to be a significant determinant of the average student debt among
borrowers in both public and private schools. He finds that a 10 percent increase in state aid per
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undergraduate is associated with a .5 percent decrease in student debt on average. He concludes
that a one-hundred-point increase in SAT scores decreases average debt by .157 percentage points
for public schools and a decrease of .150 percentage points in private schools. This implies that
higher quality institutions, or those with higher SAT midpoints, lead to lower average debt for
students, controlling for other factors.
Racial default disparities exist as well. Huelsman (2015) finds that Black and low-income
students borrow more while Black and Hispanic students are dropping out of college at higher
rates than White students. He also finds that Black and low-income students borrow more for a
bachelors and more often, while associate’s degree borrowing has spiked particularly among Black
students over the past decade. Latino graduates borrow at similar rates and slightly lower amounts
than White students. Default rates for Black and Hispanic students (8.2 percent and 5.6 percent
respectively) are higher than the rate for white students (2.6 percent). In addition, students who
defaulted were found to have earned less than students who did not. “While 50.6 percent of all
students who did not default earned less than $60,000, 71.1 percent of Black and 77.7 percent of
Hispanic students who defaulted earned less than this amount” (Bynoe & Di Liberto., 2017). This
means that minorities receive a lower return on investment for college, even without defaulting on
loans. Charron-Chenier et al., (2020) also finds racial disparities among borrowers, showing that,
while both White and Black borrowers stand to experience a substantial wealth increase from
student loan forgiveness, the magnitude of the racial wealth gap among student borrowers remains
essentially unchanged at any forgiveness level considered. This implies that for virtually any
cancellation amount considered, White borrowers experience greater average wealth gains than
Black borrowers. Feinberg (2020) corroborates these findings as well, and shows that student debt
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burdens disproportionately affect minority and female students. He also finds that graduate student
debt is associated with a slightly reduced likelihood of entering academia.
Bynoe & Di Liberto., (2017) find other trends comparing student loan debt and regular
loan debt. When examining the percent of loan balances that are 90 or more days delinquent, they
find that the proportion of student loan delinquency has been steadily increasing from 2003-2017.
This is contrasted by the proportion of regular loan delinquency, which has been decreasing
steadily since 2010. These findings are corroborated by Clifford (2016), who shows that the severe
delinquency status of borrowers has increased steadily in the United States.
Researchers continue to find similar trends regarding debt; outstanding student loan debt
is growing, minority and low-income borrowers are those most negatively affected, and the burden
of student loan debt has become crippling to millions. These effects seem to be robust over
different sample groups, different types of institutions and different years of observation,
suggesting that the issue is endemic and requires policy change.
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Chapter 4: Methods and Data
The models are based on the general theory that more selective schools have lower
likelihoods of student loan default. This could be due to students at more selective schools being
more driven, a higher quality of education, or increased rigor from classes leading to a graduating
cohort more prepared for the labor market. It follows that the more prepared a cohort is for the
labor market, the better labor market outcomes will be, and the less likely a cohort is to default.
Less selective schools are defined as those with higher levels of admission rates and lower levels
of ACT scores while the opposite is true for highly selective schools.
Schools are broken down by selectivity measures in Figures 1 and 2, with the prior focusing
on the selectivity of schools by ACT score, and the latter focusing on the selectivity of schools by
admission percentages. ACT selectivity is broken down into low (0-18), moderate (19-23), and
high (24+), while admission percentage selectivity is broken down into low (100-80%), moderate
(79-40%), and high (<39%). Moderately selective schools were the most common for both
measures, while highly selective schools were the least common. Only fifty-two schools were
found to have highly selective ACT scores while twenty-five have highly selective admission
percentages.
The theoretical framework for the model is broken down into three categories: Selectivity
Measures, School Characteristics, and Student Characteristics. Selectivity Measures are the ACT
scores of incoming freshmen and admission percentages of universities. School Characteristics
include various statistics about the universities and Student Characteristics are the demographics
of the students attending each respective university. School and Student Characteristics are used
as control variables. The theoretical model can be seen in Equation (1).
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DEFAULT = 𝑓(Selectivity Measures, School Characteristics, Student Characteristics) (1)

To test this theory, I develop an empirical model based on the theoretical model, which is an OLS
regression model that can be seen in Equation (2).
DEFAULTi = β0 + ACTi + β2 ADMITPCTi + β3 LOGTUITIONi + β4 𝐶𝑅𝑁i + β5 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸i
+ β6 PCTSTEMi + β7 WHITEPCTi + β8 FENROLLPCTi + β9 LOGPELLi
(2)
+ β10 150COMi + β11 100COMi +β12 FINAIDi + β13 RETENTIONi
+ β13 GRADUATEi + ENROLLi + εi

The dependent variable DEFAULT is the cohort default rate for the university, where a
cohort is defined as a group of students in a similar year of study. Default rates are calculated using
the current graduating cohort of students plus the two most recent cohorts. For example, the cohort
default rate for 2018 is calculated using the default rates of student borrowers entering repayment
from 2018, 2017, and 2016. A single observation is the average default rate for the three cohorts
over the average total number of borrowers for the same periods. The dataset contains cohort
default rates from 436 4-year public universities in the United States from 2013 through 2018.
Selectivity Measures. The variable ACT is the average composite ACT at the 25th
percentile for the incoming freshmen of the university. I expect the higher the average ACT scores
for a university, the lower the likelihood of loan default. The variable ADMITPCT is the
percentage of applicants that were accepted to the university. The higher the percentage of
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accepted applicants, the less selective the school, and therefore, the higher the chance for loan
default.
School Characteristics. The variable LOGTUITION is the logged total tuition for a year
of schooling, including fees, for the university. I expect that students will rely more heavily on
loans where tuition is larger, implying a positive increase in the chance of default. The vector CRN
is the Carnegie Classification for the university. This shows the kinds of degrees (bachelors,
masters, doctorates) granted in each university, and the variable is split into three dummies to
denote differing levels of available programs at universities. Dummy variables are created and
defined as “Low”, denoting classifications of 15-17, “Medium”, denoting classifications of 18-20,
and “High”, denoting classifications of 21 and up. The higher the classification, the more available
programs and degrees at the university. I expect a lower default rate for institutions with more
available programs at higher levels of study. The vector STATE is a dummy variable denoting the
state the university resides in. This is a control variable to capture differences across states that are
not otherwise captured in the model. An example of this could be post-secondary funding programs
that exist in one state but not another. The Variable STEMPCT is the average proportion of degrees
awarded each year in STEM fields for the university. I expect the larger the share of STEM
degrees, the lower the default rate due to higher average salaries for STEM graduates. The variable
LOGPELL is the logged form of the amount awarded in Pell grants to the students in the university.
Observations are given as the total cumulative dollar amount in Pell grants for a given year. Pell
grants are given based on financial need and research has shown that Pell grants have a positive
effect on the Returns-on-investments for students. I expect a negative relationship with Pell grants
and default rates.
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Student Characteristics. WHITEPCT refers to the percentage of white students enrolled in
the university. FENROLLPCT refers to the percentage of female students enrolled in the
university. Both WHITEPCT and FENROLLPCT are control variables used to capture some of
the variation in default rates attributed to racial and gender inequalities. I expect a positive
relationship between FENROLLPCT and default while I expect a negative relationship between
WHITEPCT and default. 150COM and 100COM represent the average percentage of
undergraduates completing their degree within 150 percent and 100 percent respectively of the
normal degree timeframe. For 4-year universities, this means completing a degree within 6 years
for 150COM and within 4 years for 100COM. FINAID denotes the amount of financial aid loaned
to the students of the university. FINAID captures socioeconomic differences denoted by the
reliance on student loans to fund a degree. I expect FINAID to have a positive effect on default.
The variable RETENTION is the percentage of first-time students who began their studies in the
Fall and returned to school the following Fall. Greater retention potentially captures a greater
motivation of the average student at the university to earn the degree, and is a proxy for student
traits that might lead to a lower likelihood of defaulting on student loans. Observations are given
as a rate for the university, and I expect higher levels of RETENTION to result in lower default
rates. GRADRATE is the average graduation rate for the university. Higher graduation rates imply
better labor market outcomes, which would lead to a lower chance of default on loan payoff. I
expect a negative relationship with default rates. ENROLL denotes the total enrollment for a
university. This variable controls for factors that might differ across universities of different sizes.
A summary of variable definitions and hypothesized signs can be seen in Table 1.
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Data is pulled from several sources, including the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) and the Federal Student Aid service through the Department of Education. Due to the
missing values for many schools over multiple years, a decision was made to focus on the years
2016 through 2018, which resulted in complete data for all variables for 436 schools. Each variable
represents the annual average for these three years for the university.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables. The mean default rate is about
6.5 percent for all institutions, with the smallest default at .833 percent and the largest at 23.8
percent. The average ACT score is 20, and the average admission rate is 68 percent. The minimum
ACT score is 14.67 which acts as a lower bound for selectivity of institutions. In addition, the
minimum admission percentage is 17 percent. The most selective schools have average ACT
scores of 29.333 and admission percentages of 17 percent. The least selective schools have average
ACT scores of 14.67 and admission percentages of 100 percent. The mean for FINAID is about
$30,348. This is consistent with the national average level of debt for a 4-year degree in the United
States ($30,000). Means for WHITEPCT and FENROLLPCT are 59.9 percent and 55.5 percent
respectively, implying that the average school is more than half white, while also being a little
over half female.
In addition, the minimum admission percentage is 17 percent. The most selective schools
have average ACT scores of 29.333 and admission percentages of 17 percent. The least selective
schools have average ACT scores of 14.67 and admission percentages of 100 percent. The mean
for FINAID is about $30,348. This is consistent with the national average level of debt for a 4year degree in the United States ($30,000). Means for WHITEPCT and FENROLLPCT are 59.9
percent and 55.5 percent respectively, implying that the average school is more than half white,
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while also being a little over half female. Means for 150COM and 100COM are 51.15 and 35.98
respectively, meaning that on average 51 percent of students completed their degree within six
years and 35.98 percent completed their degree within four years. The mean for GRADRATE is
50.88 percent, while the minimum and maximum are 12.33 percent and 93.33 percent respectively.
The average for STEMPCT is 12.9 percent, with the highest proportion being 87.9 percent.
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Table 1
Variable Definitions and Expected Signs
Dependent Variable:
DEFAULT

Description

Hypothesized
Sign

Average student loan default rate in university (i)
Variables:
ACT

Average ACT score at the 25th percentile in university (i)

-

ADMITPCT

Average acceptance rate for university (i)

+

LOGTUITION

Average total yearly tuition (logged) for a university (i)

+

CRNHIG

1 if university (i) is ranked 21+, 0 otherwise

?

CRNMED

1 if university (i) is ranked 18-20, 0 otherwise

?

CRNLOW

1 if university (i) is ranked 15-17, 0 otherwise

?

STATE

Dummy variable denoting the state in which university (i) resides

?

PCTSTEM

Average percentage of total degrees awarded by university (i)
that are classified as STEM degrees

-

WHITEPCT

Average percentage of white students enrolled in university (i)

?

FENROLLPCT

Average percentage of students in university (i) that identify as
female

?

LOGPELL

Average Pell grant amount awarded in university (i)

+

150COM

Average percentage of students that completed their education
within 150 percent of the normal time frame in university (i)

?

100COM

Average percentage of students that completed their education
within 100 percent of the normal time frame in university (i)

?

FINAID

Average total financial aid taken out in university (i) (Values are
divided by 1,000 for ease of interpretation)

+

RETENTION

Average number of students who began their studies in the Fall
and returned to school the following Fall in university (i)

-

GRADRATE

The average graduation percentage for university (i)

-

ENROLL

Average number of students enrolled in university (i)
(Values are divided by 1,000 for ease of interpretation)

?
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Table 2
Summary Statistics (N=436)
Variable
Dependent Variable:
DEFAULT
Independent Variables:
ACT
ADMITPCT
LOGTUITION
PCTSTEM
WHITEPCT
FENROLLPCT
LOGPELL
150COM
100COM
FINAID
RETENTION
GRADRATE
ENROLL

Mean

6.474

20.013
68.085
7.789
.129
59.908
55.558
7.11
51.15
35.988
30,348.375
76.169
50.888
14,511324.0

Standard
Deviation
3.7

2.877
15.925
.524
.119
22.533
9.02
.377
16.441
16.602
13,520.382
9.809
16.679
12,002.419

Min

.833

14.677
17
5.928
0.
1.333
11
5.42
12
3
0
49.333
12.333
829.333

Max

23.8

29.333
100
8.981
.879
94
88.333
7.921
93.333
89
131,894
97
93.333
61,103
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Chapter 5: Results
When selectivity and default rates are examined graphically, a clear trend can be seen with
default rates and ACT scores (Figure 3), while no obvious trend can be seen with default rates and
admission percentages (Figure 4). There is a clear negative trend with the first selectivity measure
with higher levels of ACT scores leading to lower chances of default. Figure 2 has no visually
obvious trends, however there are more observations of high default clustered around higher
admission percentages. Figure 5 shows the effect of the proportion of STEM degrees on default
rates. Similar to Figure 1, there is a clear downward sloping trend, where higher proportions of
STEM degrees lead to lower default rates. Default rates by enrollment size can be seen in Figure
6. While there is a weak trend of higher enrollment leading to lower default rates, the effect is very
small.
The OLS regression results are provided in Table 3. The first column of results (1)
represents estimation of equation (1) which includes both measures of selectivity (ACT and
ADMITPCT). Columns (2) and (3) provide the results when each is included separately. About
eighty percent of the variation in default rates was explained in each specification. The F-Statistic
was significant at the .01 level for each specification, so I reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficients for the independent variables were jointly equal to zero. I also reject the null
hypotheses that the adjusted R2 was equal to zero, meaning each specification of the empirical
model is significant at the .01 level.
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Table 3
Regression Output
(1)

(2)

(3)

Variables:
ACT
ADMITPCT
CRNHIG
CRNMED
LOGTUITION
PCTSTEM
WHITEPCT
FENROLLPCT
LOGPELL
150COM
100COM
FINAID
(In 1,000s)
RETENTION
GRADRATE
ENROLL
(In 1,000s)
INTERCEPT
Sample Size:
Adj R2:
F-Statistic:

-0.281**
(0.085)
-0.014
(0.007)
0.817
(0.466)
0.470
(0.272)
-4.134***
(0.677)
-1.492
(1.368)
-0.047***
(0.007)
-0.047**
(0.015)
6.168***
(0.805)
-0.029
(0.054)
0.055*
(0.028)
0.030**
(0.009)
-0.121***
(0.025)
0.031
(0.044)
-0.037*
(0.018)
16.280
436
.802
27.28***

-0.248**
(0.084)
--0.858
(0.461)
0.515
(.272)
-4.179***
(0.679)
-1.574
(1.372)
-0.052***
(0.006)
-0.047**
(0.015)
6.043***
(0.805)
-0.045
(0.054)
0.062*
(0.027)
0.028**
(0.009)
-0.120***
(0.025)
0.039
(0.044)
-0.033
(0.018)
16.080
436
.801
27.47***

---0.008
(0.007)
1.004*
(0.471)
0.490
(.277)
-4.720***
(0.661)
-3.424**
(1.265)
-0.055***
(0.006)
-0.056 ***
(0.015)
6.886***
(0.792)
-0.005
(0.054)
0.035
(0.027)
0.025**
(0.009)
-0.131***
(0.025)
0.009
(0.044)
-0.045*
(0.019)
12.280
436
.794
26.56***

*Note: Values for coefficients are given with their respective standard deviation below in parentheses.
State dummies not included in output results.
Significance denoted by asterisks (* for 10%, ** for 5%, *** for 1%)
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For the full model specification (1), the estimated coefficients of ACT, are negative, while
being significant at the .05 level. I fail to reject the null for ACT, meaning that variations in ACT
scores influenced the variations in default rates. An increase of one point in average ACT scores
reduces default rates by .281 percentage points, controlling for other factors. This supports my
hypothesis that higher ACT scores decrease the chance of default rate and reinforces the idea that
the more selective a school is, the lower the likelihood on default. ACT was the better of the two
selectivity variables and captured some of the variation in default rates. This finding is also
supported by prior research and implies that stronger academic outcomes lead to a better ability to
pay off debt.
The estimated coefficients of ADMITPCT are positive, while being insignificant. I reject
the null for ADMITPCT, meaning the variations in admission percentages have no influence on
default rates. This does not support my hypothesis. Changes to admission percentages do not
impact the chance for default on student loans. Further, admission percentages are a poor means
of capturing the variation in default rates as there are many instances where an individual gets
admitted to a university based on extracurricular background or other non-academic qualities.
More specific restrictions on the definition of admission must be administered if the variable is to
be a reliable means of gauging selectivity.
The estimated coefficient on LOGTUITION was negative and statistically different from
zero at the .01 level. This is the opposite to what research suggests and means that a one percent
increase in total tuition decreases the default rate by about 4 percentage points, controlling for
other factors. This is also counter to my hypothesis, and the negative sign on LOGTUITION could
be caused by factors that weren’t able to be controlled for in the empirical model, such as the
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amount of tuition waived. In addition, higher levels of tuition would act as a paywall, and default
rates could decrease due to lower levels of enrollment. Furthermore, it is likely that the students
that attend these schools could afford the higher levels of tuition, implying a stronger ability to pay
off student debt.
The estimated coefficient on WHITEPCT is negative and statistically different from zero
at the .01 level. This means that a one percent increase in the proportion of Whites in a university
causes a .047 percentage point decrease in default rates. This result is consistent with my
hypothesis and prior research. Schools that have higher proportions of white students have a lower
likelihood that students will default, implying racial disparities in default rates.
The estimated coefficients for FENROLLPCT are negative and statistically different from
zero at the .05 level. This means a one percent increase in the proportion of female students causes
a .047 percentage point decrease in default rates. This is not consistent with my hypothesis and
implies higher proportions of female students cause lower chances of default on student loans.
The estimated coefficient on LOGPELL is positive and statistically different from zero at
the .01 level. This means a one percentage point increase in the amount awarded in Pell grants
decreases the chance of default by 6.168 percentage points. This is inconsistent with my hypothesis
but makes logical sense. Pell Grants are a means of measuring socioeconomic status and are
granted based on financial need. In universities where the amount awarded in Pell Grants is greater,
there are greater proportions of low-income students, and therefore, a greater proportion of
students that are more likely to default on loans.
The estimated coefficient on FINAID was positive and was statistically different from zero
at the .05 level. The coefficient can be interpreted as a one percentage point increase in financial
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aid increases the chance of default by .030 percent. This is consistent with my hypothesis and prior
research. Higher levels of financial aid cause lower default rates.
The estimated coefficient on RETENTION was negative and statistically different from
zero at the .01 level. It can be interpreted as a one percent increase in retention rates decreases the
chance of default by .121 percent. This supports my hypothesis and means that the higher the
percentage of students returning to school after their first year, the lower the chance of default.
The estimated coefficient for ENROLL is negative and statistically different from zero at
the .10 level. This does not support my hypothesis and can be interpreted as a one percentage point
increase in total enrollment causes a .037 percent decrease in the chance of default.
Other coefficients, such as those for PCTSTEM, CRN, and GRADRATE are all
insignificant and we cannot reject the null that they are statistically different from zero. This means
changes to the proportion of stem degrees awarded, the Carnegie classification, and the graduation
rate have no impact on the likelihood of default. While this is inconsistent with prior research, the
sample used in the study and the method of regression may have some influence.
Columns (2) and (3) report that when ADMITPCT is removed, ACT remains significant at
the .05 level, but when ACT is removed, ADMITPCT remains insignificant. No other large
differences in independent variable coefficients or significance exist across specifications.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Further Research
The purpose of this study was to examine if more selective schools, or those with higher
ACT scores and lower admission rates, had lower rates of student loan default. A dataset was
created using 436, 4-year public universities from the United States from 2013 to 2018. The main
findings show that higher average ACT scores led to lower default rates. This is robust across
several specifications, implying that the more selective a school is, the lower the chance students
from that school will default on their student loans. Several school and student characteristic
variables were also found to influence default rates, including the gender, ethnicity and retention
levels of students.
My findings are consistent with prior research, although there are some notable departures
such as the effect gender has on default rates and the relationship between tuition and default.
Higher levels of tuition decreased the chance of default. This trend was found to be true for all
model specifications and may be explained by the income demographics of students.
Further research could be conducted using different kinds of institutions, such as private,
2-year, For-Profit, and non-traditional schools, such as in the Clifford study. The results from the
same model, using different types of universities could yield strikingly different results. One of
the drawbacks of this study is that it focuses solely on 4-year public universities. Comparing and
contrasting results from different types of universities would be useful for understanding a more
complete picture of the nature of default rates. Other variables that have been shown to be
significant determinants of default, such as fist-generation status, could also be added for the
benefit of further studies. Further research following a specific cohort over the course of their
academic career could also be helpful in understanding student loan trends over time. Beginning
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the study at the start of freshman year, and ending when that cohort graduates, could yield more
granular data, such as changes in financial aid taken out. Much research has been published on the
history of student debt (Gross et al., 2009; Pyne and Grodsky, 2020; Mitchell et al., 2016) and on
potential solutions to student debt (Hedlund, 2022; Delisle et al., 2014; Martin, 2016; Velez et al.,
2019; Fuinhas et al., 2019). This study serves as an addition to the growing amount of research on
the subject of student debt.
With a significant body of evidence that exists, stating that personal financial education
can make a difference in young people’s lives, offering courses on financial literacy could be
beneficial in stemming the tide of default. According to the Council for Economic Education, only
25 states require an economics course to graduate high school, while only 23 require a personal
finance course to graduate. Furthermore, no central database exists that tracks institutions offering
personal finance courses for students’ benefit, rather than as a routine part of a business school
curriculum. The Financial Security Project at Boston College identified more than 100 U.S.
colleges and universities that offer for-credit courses in personal finance, which is far from the
approximate total of 5,300 colleges and universities in the U.S. The lack of required education
regarding personal finance could be alleviated with an introductory finance seminar for incoming
college freshmen, especially at low-selectivity institutions. Where universities that have lower
average ACT scores also tend to have higher default rates, offering a class on financial literacy
could decrease the likelihood of default by giving students the tools they need to navigate the
student loan market.
In addition, examining schools with lower ACT scores of incoming freshmen could
provide some useful information as to why default rates are higher there than other schools. If
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there are certain traits found within less selective schools that more selective schools do not
possess, a program could be created to remove the trait. The amount awarded in Pell Grants has
been shown here and in prior research to be a strong measure of socioeconomic status. Because
they are granted based on financial need, the more Pell Grants awarded to a university, the larger
the financial need of students at that university. Similar to looking at schools with low ACT scores
of incoming freshmen, examining the traits of schools with a large number of Pell Grant recipients
could offer some insight as to why financial need is so high.
Finally, this finding can be used to help schools with higher likelihoods of default by means
of reallocation of resources. Schools that accept students with lower ACT scores, on average, have
students with higher likelihood of default, meaning that funding and loan forgiveness programs
would be better suited at these institutions. While most states have at least one federal loan
forgiveness program, some states have none, including Tennessee, North Dakota, and Utah.
Reallocating federal and state aid to schools that have lower average ACT scores could lessen the
financial strain on students and decrease the chance of default.
On April 6, 2022, the U.S Department of Education extended COVID-19 emergency relief
for student loans through August 31, 2022. Included in this relief is a suspension of loan payments,
a zero percent interest rate and stopped collections on defaulted loans. While this acts as a stopgap
for lowering student default rates, a more permanent solution may be reached with policy changes.
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Appendix A: Figures
Figure 1
Count of Schools by ACT scores

Count of SELECTIVITY(ACT Scores)
300

250

239

200

150

130

100

52
50

0
High (24-)

Low (0-18)

Moderate(19-23)

Note. Measures of ACT scores arbitrarily broken into three categories to denote different levels
of selectivity. The count of schools is on the Y-axis, with the selectivity categories on the X-axis.
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Figure 2
Count of Schools by Admission Percentages
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Note. Measures of admission percentages arbitrarily broken into three categories to denote
selectivity of schools. The count of schools is on the X-axis, with the categories on the Y-axis.
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Figure 3
Default Rates and ACT scores

Note. Scatter plot with ACT scores of university students on the X-axis and default rates of
universities on the Y-axis.
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Figure 4
Default Rates and Admission Percentages

Note. Scatter plot with the admission percentages of universities on the X-Axis and the default
rates of universities on the Y-axis.
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Figure 5
Default Rates and Proportions of STEM Degrees

Note. Scatter plot with the proportion of STEM degrees awarded in a university on the X-axis
and the default rates of universities on the Y-axis.
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Figure 6
Default Rates and Enrollment
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Note. Line graph showing the enrollment and default rates of universities on the Y-axis.
Enrollment has been divided by a factor of 2000.

